Is ACOEM Applicable after 90 Days? Stephen L. Kline, Esq.
ARMSTRONG LAW FIRM
stephenk@arm-law.com Applicant’s
Attorneys are making loud noises again about the limitation of ACOEM to
the first 90 days. Very limited support for this position comes from one
panel decision Hamilton v. Goodwill Industries, 2004 Cal. Wrk.
Comp. P.D. LEXIS 87 where the WCAB Panel held that ACOEM Guidelines were
inapplicable because they applied to ''acute'' injuries only, which WCAB
interpreted as first 90 days following injury, and that, because Guidelines
were inapplicable, applicant had no burden to rebut presumption of their
correctness by ''preponderance of the scientific medical evidence,'' pursuant
to Labor Code § 4604.5.
The Stockton Judge, the WCAB and the defense counsel all failed to cite
and argue Labor Code section 4600 (b) which states,
“ As used in this division and notwithstanding any other provision
of law, medical treatment that is reasonably required to cure or
relieve the injured worker from the effects of his or her injury means
treatment that is based upon the guidelines adopted by the administrative
director pursuant to Section 5307.27 or, prior to the adoption of those
guidelines, the updated American College of Occupational and Environmental
Medicine's Occupational Medicine Practice Guidelines.” Emphasis
added.
Bad habits repeat themselves. It is apparent that another Work Compensation
Judge (WCJ), the WCAB and defense counsel again failed to cite and argue
Labor Code section 4600 (b). In an Anaheim WCAB case, the WCJ cited Hamilton as
part of the basis for his opinion that epidural injections requested two
years post injury by a primary treating physician should be authorized.
On July 8, 2005, the Fourth District Court of Appeals denied a Writ in
the matter of ICW Group/Explorer Insurance Company v. WCAB (Ulloa),
70 Cal Comp Cases ***. Concerns have been raised because the Writ’s
denial may be argued to give life to the erroneous Hamilton concept
that ACOEM is only applicable to the first 90 days.
A closer look at the Court of Appeals opinion indicates that the defense
in this matter consistently made one mistake after another. First, they
failed to forward all of the utilization review decisions to Applicant's
counsel, after the applicant became represented, as requested. Then, they
relied on a QME who “opined that Applicant was not in need
of ''active medical care.'' The same QME also opined that Applicant would
need medical care for periods of ''significant increased symptoms in the
form of orthopedic re-evaluation, nonsteroidal anti-inflamatory medications
and brief courses of physical therapy.'' The defense problems get compounded
when they failed to follow the utilization review timelines.
The WCAB merely adopted the WCJ’s denial of Reconsideration.
The Carrier requested review at the Court of Appeals based on three separate
grounds: The first was that “ WCAB erred by limiting the use of the
ACOEM guidelines to the acute stage of an injury”; the second was
that WCAB erred by “finding their utilization review decisions untimely;” and
third that the WCAB erred by “disregarding the defense QME report”.
In denying the Writ the Fourth District said, “Regarding
the first and second issues, even if the WCAB did commit
the claimed errors, their correction would not affect the outcome of
the case because the WCAB decided the case on alternate
grounds”.
There is nothing in this language that approves of Hamilton and
its 90 day theory. In fact, there is a strong recognition that the WCJ
and the WCAB were incorrect in their limitation of ACOEM. In criminal law,
we used to call that “harmless error.”
The Court continued, “Regarding the second and third issues, the
record is inadequate to support a grant of review because ICW did not include
the treatment requests, the utilization review decisions, or the QME report
with its petition.”
“Finally, regarding the third issue, the WCJ determined Ulloa was
experiencing significant increased symptoms, which ICW's QME acknowledged
would require further care. ICW does not dispute these findings or establish
the underlying.”
So back to my original question, does ACOEM apply after the first 90
days of an injury?
Let’s look at the Statute and listen to the Legislature: What kind
of treatment does one provide for an industrial injury? The answer is “reasonable
and necessary to cure and / or relieve the injured worker from the effects
of his / her injury”.
Is there any statutory definition of the language stated in the preceding
paragraph?
You bet. Labor Code section 4600 (b) defines that treatment as the AD’s
guidelines as soon as they are drafted, ACOEM, or other evidence based
medicine.
Finally, in support of my argument, the WCAB en banc, in Simmons
v State of California (SCIF), 70 Cal Comp Cases 866 (June, 2005)
stated,
“As to the ACOEM issue in this case, SCIF is correct: (1) that
it is liable only for medical treatment reasonably required to cure or
relieve the effects of the injury ( Lab. Code, § 4600); (2) that,
under the law presently in effect, ''reasonably required'' medical treatment
generally ''means treatment that is based upon . . . the updated [ACOEM
guidelines]'' ( Lab. Code, § 4600(b)); and (3) that the ACOEM
guidelines are ''presumptively correct on the issue of extent and scope
of medical treatment, regardless of date of injury.''
From the Simmons decision, it appears the WCAB acknowledges the new and strict
limitations created by newly enacted Labor Code Section 4600(b). From Hamilton
and this Writ denial in ICW Group, it also seems clear the WCAB and the Courts
will not perfect the defense for a defendant. More than ever, it is critical
that the issues of UR and L.C. 4600(b) be properly presented before the WCAB
to achieve the result which is appropriate. If your representative at the
WCAB fails to raise the appropriate issues and present the necessary evidence,
these are the results to be anticipated.
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